When contributors to a common cause (or public good) are uncertain about each others' valuations, early contributors are likely to be cautious in free-riding on future contributors. Contrary to the case of complete information, when contributors have independent private valuations for the public good, the expected total contribution generated in a sequential move game may be higher than in a simultaneous move game. This is established in a conventional framework with quasi-linear utility where agents care only about the total provision of the public good (rather than individual contribution levels) and there is no non-convexity in the provision of the public good. We allow for arbitrary number of agents and fairly general distribution of types.
that often take place over a length of time. Fundraisers or providers of the public good have limited resources to expend on reaching out to and establishing contact with potential donors who might identify with their specific objectives. This, along with frictions in the flow of information across donors and a wide variety of donor-specific factors, implies that in course of the campaign, contributors may "arrive" and make their contributions at different points of time. One important practical question that arises then is whether a contributor should be informed about actual contributions made (or, the funds raised) till that point of time in the campaign. This question acquires significance in view of the fact that if donors observe past contributions before making their own contribution, then there is an incentive for early contributors to free ride: by making low contributions and pre-committing to not contribute later, early movers can shift the burden to late movers. In other words, revealing information about past contributions can create a dynamic free-riding effect if donors can pre-commit to not contribute in the future.
This dynamic free-riding effect was formalized by Varian (1994) in a complete information game of voluntary contribution to a public good where it was shown that if agents contribute sequentially i.e., each agent contributes after observing the contributions made by the earlier agents in an exogenous order of moves where each agent contributes only once, the total contribution generated often falls short of, and never exceeds, the total contribution if the agents make their contribution decisions simultaneously (i.e., without observing the contribution made by any other agent). For instance, if there are two agents with quasi-linear utility and their marginal valuations of the public good are ordered, then in a simultaneous move game, the agent with the higher valuation is the sole contributor and the public good is provided at a level that is individually optimal for this agent (which is inefficient). In a sequential contribution game, it is possible that the higher valuation agent moves first, contributes zero and the lower valuation agent then contributes her individually optimal level so that the public good is provided at even a lower level.
The theoretical argument outlined above implies that fundraisers or charities should not announce or reveal contributions during the campaign (perhaps announce only at the end of the campaign, to generate snob value or publicity for donors). 1 This is, however, extensively contradicted by real world evidence that information about past contributions are made available to prospective new contributors. Much of this evidence comes from fundraising by charities where major donations are announced during the fundraising campaign (see, among others, the discussion on capital campaigns in Andreoni (2006) ). A number of field studies and experimental works on public goods also demonstrate the merits of sequential contribution with announcement of contributions (over simultaneous contribution) (see Silverman et al. 1984; List and Lucking-Reiley 2002; Potters et al. 2005; Coats et al. 2009 ). One way to reconcile the real world observations with the theoretical result outlined above is to argue that the latter requires that the order of moves of contributors be exogenous, and that each agent contribute only once; both of these assumptions may not be satisfied in real world fundraising situations where donors may decide on their order of moves endogenously and may not be able to commit to contribute only once. If either of these hold, then in Varian's framework the sequential and simultaneous move games generate identical outcomes and, in particular, revealing past contributions is no worse than not revealing them.
However, it is also arguable that in many real world situations, the order of arrival of major donors is to a significant extent determined by exogenous factors such as the advertising and solicitation strategy of the fundraising agency, the flow of information across social networks, fluctuations in wealth of donors, news shocks and so on. To that extent, contributors may often be sharply constrained in their ability to choose their order of moves. Further, in actual fundraising or voluntary contribution processes, it is not possible for outsiders to observe whether major donors can commit to not contribute in the future; however, it is certainly true that in many of these fund drives, major donors actually contribute only once.
In many cases, the very structure of contribution may also limit the possibility of a donor contributing more than once. For example, in some fundraising events donors are called upon sequentially to make their pledges. There are instances of fundraising in churches and other social gatherings where, at the end of the service or the main social event, donors put their money in a box or basket-if the box or basket is transparent (as it is in many cases) they can observe the contributions made by others. There is some evidence that in such events, being able to observe the contributions made by others does actually increase total contribution. 2 To reconcile these with the theoretical result in Varian (1994) , one needs additional arguments.
In recent years, a significant theoretical literature has developed to explain the real world practice of using sequential fundraising schemes and revealing contributions to prospective donors. One strand of this literature has shown that the sequential format may generate higher total contribution (than the simultaneous move case) even when agents have only one chance to contribute, i.e., exactly under the conditions that generate lower provision of the public good through the dynamic incentive to free ride in Varian's framework. This paper forms a part of this strand of the literature. We argue that the reason why revealing previous contributions to prospective donors may make sense even when donors contribute only once (and therefore, can free ride on future donors) is because the true willingness of a contributor to pay for the public good is her private information that is, at least to a significant extent, unknown to other contributors. In the incomplete information structure generated by independent private preferences for the public good, when donors contribute without observing the actual contributions or types of other donors, they base their own contributions on the expected contribution of other donors, which implies that a higher valuation donor tends to reduce her contribution and free ride on the possibility that other donors may turn out to have relatively higher valuation; further, a contributor with fairly low valuation may contribute very little as she gambles on the event that other contributors have much higher valuations and will contribute generously. The net effect is that in states of the world where a large proportion of contributors are actually ones with relatively low valuations, the total contribution may be excessively small relative to what these low valuation contributors would have provided under complete information. When contributions are made sequentially and past contributions are observed, this problem is partially redressed because later contributors make their donations knowing what the earlier ones have contributed, and do not need to guess their valuations or contributions. Thus, when the early contributors have low valuations, higher valuation late movers can make up for their low contributions; on the other hand, when the early movers have higher valuation, they may find it too risky to free ride on late movers as the latter may seriously underprovide the public good if they happen to be of lower valuation type. The net effect can result in an improvement in the expected provision of the public good relative to a situation where donors do not observe the actions of any other donor.
Existing theoretical papers that contain results about the efficacy of sequential contribution schemes with announcement of contributions even when donors contribute only once, are as follows. (Some of these papers also analyze the outcome where early donors may contribute a second time.) Andreoni (1998) analyzes fundraising for big-value public projects with thresholds introducing non-convexity in production. The fundraising team may cultivate a few leading donors in the early stages, secure their pledges and then announce them to launch the public fund-drive of the campaign when the rest of the potential donors contribute. The knowledge that the threshold funds have been raised improves the marginal productivity of follower contributions, thus creating advantages for a sequential contribution format. 3 In contrast to this paper, our results are derived in a convex framework (as in Varian 1994) with no threshold effect in the production technology of the public good. Romano and Yildirim (2001) consider warm-glow and snob effects in the utility function of donors; each donor not only cares about the total contribution or the total provision of the public good, but also the individual contribution levels of other donors. Using complementarities between individual contributions, they show that being able to observe past contributions can raise the total contribution. Our results, in contrast, are based on a more conventional formulation where contributors care only about the total provision of the public good and the cost of their own contribution. Vesterlund (2003) considers a model where donors have common valuation of the charity but are uncertain about the quality of the charity. More generous gifts from early donors, who may have privately acquired information about quality, prompts later stage donors to give higher donations and this, in turn, motivates high quality charities to publicly announce contributions. In contrast to Vesterlund's paper, donors in our paper have independent private valuation for the public good and there is no question of contributions revealing private information about the charity. Indeed, our results are not based on any informational advantage or signaling value of announcement of contributions. 4 Finally, a recent literature on joint projects in teams and competitive races in innovations (especially in softwares) with public good features focuses on the sequential contribution format with exogenous order of moves (Winter 2006; Bessen and Maskin 2009) . In these models, it is natural to focus on production functions that allow for some complementarity in individual contributions or inputs. These papers do not compare sequential and simultaneous mechanisms, but instead take sequential settings as given. It is intuitive that in team problems with complementary technologies, sequential voluntary contributions may outperform simultaneous contributions. 5 Our results suggest that even when individual contributions are perfect substitutes, incomplete information (say, arising from uncertainty about the input cost of individual team members) can lead to superiority of sequential design.
Specifically, we analyze a conventional model of voluntary contribution to a public good where agents have quasi-linear utility. The model is a direct extension of the one in Varian (1994) to a Bayesian setting where contributors have (independent) private information about their valuation of the public good. We allow for arbitrary number of agents and fairly general distribution of types. We show that under certain sufficient conditions that include concavity of the marginal utility from the public good, the expected total contribution generated in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a sequential move contribution game is at least as large as that in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move contribution game if the agent who moves last in the sequential game is one who makes a strictly positive contribution in the simultaneous move game for every possible realization of her type. We obtain this result, even though each agent has only one chance to contribute and can therefore pre-commit to contributions. Further, if the equilibrium in the sequential game is one where some 4 In an earlier paper (Bag and Roy 2008) , we consider a multistage game of contribution to a public good with all agents having the option to contribute in all stages. There we show that under incomplete information about the agents' (independent private) valuations of the public good, the expected total contribution is higher if the contributions made at each stage are observed before the next stage; the economic reasoning behind this is based on the possibility of revelation of the private preferences of contributors through their actions and the incentive of higher valuation contributors to hide information about their true preferences as it may make them more vulnerable to free-riding by other agents in subsequent stages of the game. Such incentives are not important in voluntary contribution processes where agents cannot contribute repeatedly; the current paper focuses on these environments by assuming that agents move sequentially with each agent having only one turn to contribute so that later movers cannot free ride on earlier contributors, and contributors have no incentive to either hide or reveal their private valuation of the public good. 5 Intuitively, with sequential contribution, agents might be able to better coordinate their costly activities (i.e., efforts or contributions) towards improved collective outcome than under simultaneous contributions. In fact, Agastya (2009) shows, in a joint project setting similar to one in Agastya et al. (2007) (see footnote 3), that sequential contribution would yield a better chance of project completion than simultaneous contribution. But this ranking is then reversed if one adds cheap talk possibilities prior to the contribution stage.
contributor who moves prior to the last mover, makes a strictly positive contribution with strictly positive probability or alternatively, if the marginal utility from the public good is strictly concave, then the sequential game generates strictly higher expected total contribution. In an example with two agents and two types, we show that some of these sufficient conditions are not necessary for the sequential game to generate higher contribution.
The sequential move game considered in this paper is one where every agent perfectly observes the individual contributions made by earlier contributors before making her own contribution decision. However, as we argue informally at the end of Sect. 4, our results are equally valid for a modified version of the sequential move game where each contributor observes only the sum of contributions made by earlier contributors, but not necessarily their individual contributions.
There is a substantial literature on voluntary provision of public goods under incomplete information that focus on inefficiencies that arise due to incompleteness of information. 6 We do not concern with the efficiency or normative issues 7 ; instead, we offer an incomplete information based explanation of why sequential contribution schemes may be better for the total provision of the public good.
The next section presents the model. In Sect. 3 we analyze the simultaneous contribution game, followed by an analysis of the sequential contribution game in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, we state our main results comparing the expected contributions in the sequential and simultaneous move games; in particular, we outline general conditions under which the sequential form generates higher expected total contribution. Section 6 elaborates further on these conditions. Section 7 discusses the two-agents, two-types case. The Appendix contains some proofs not included in the main text.
The model
N > 1 agents contribute voluntarily to a public good. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N } has a budget constraint w i > 0. Agent i's payoff depends on the total contribution of all agents, her own contribution and her own type, and is given by
the total contribution of all other agents j = i, and τ i is a private preference parameter of agent i that affects her marginal utility from consumption of the public good, is known only to agent i and is interpreted as the "type" of agent i. It is common knowledge that each agent i's type τ i is an independent random draw from a probability distribution with distribution function F i and compact support A i ⊂ R ++ . Let τ i and τ i be the lowest and highest possible types of agent i defined by
Define ∀i:
Under Assumption 1, 0 < z i < w i . It is easy to check that agent i would never contribute in excess of z i in any contribution game, whatever be her type. This allows us to drop w i and write agent i's payoff function simply as
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every agent i of every possible type τ i ∈ A i has a unique standalone contribution x i (τ i ) ∈ (0, w i ) defined by:
It is easy to check that x i (τ i ) is strictly increasing in τ i , implying:
The expected standalone contribution of agent i, denoted hereafter by θ i , is given by: G) . Finally, we impose:
Assumption 3 is an important technical restriction that will be useful in comparing expected total contributions under sequential and simultaneous move games. 8 Note that we do not require that the function V i (.) be concave or strictly decreasing on the entire positive real line.
While our analysis is presented for a continuously variable public good, by setting V i (G) = V (G) for all i and interpreting V (G) as the 'probability of success' of a public project with binary outcomes (success or failure) that depends on total investment G, the analysis can be easily applied to a discrete public good setting 9 ; in that case, τ i > 0 is agent i's deterministic utility if the project succeeds, while the utility obtained when the project fails is normalized to zero.
We will compare two game forms-an N -stage sequential contribution game and a simultaneous contribution game-and the solution concepts are Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, respectively. In the sequential contribution game, the agents contribute in an exogenous order and the contribution amounts become known as and when they are made. Each agent is allowed to contribute only once, and is not allowed to add to her contribution at a later stage. In the simultaneous contribution game, each agent contributes without any knowledge of other agents' contributions. We confine attention to pure strategy equilibria.
The contribution games are compared according to the (ex ante) expected total contributions made by all N agents, i.e., the expected provision of public good.
Simultaneous contribution game
First, we analyze the simultaneous contribution game. Let y i (τ i ) denote the equilibrium contribution of agent i of type
where τ −i ∈ j =i A j is the vector of types for agents other than agent i. Then, y i (τ i ) is a solution to the following expected utility maximization problem:
In what follows, we denote by F −i (τ −i ) the joint distribution of τ −i . We start with a simple observation that follows directly from the definitions of x i (τ i ) and G: 8 A simple example that satisfies all of the above assumptions is the situation where all agents have identical utility functions and distribution of types and for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
with the additional restrictions that τ i = τ , τ i = τ satisfy
Lemma 1 Consider any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move contribution game where y i (τ i ) is the contribution made by agent i of type τ i . Then,
Below we derive a much sharper bound for the expected total contribution, but first the following technical result should be noted (see the Appendix for the proof).
Lemma 2 Consider the simultaneous move game and fix an agent index i. If for some j = i, Pr{τ j : y j (τ j ) > 0} > 0, then the probability distribution of the random variable y −i = j =i y j is non-degenerate.
Lemma 3 (An upper-bound on expected total contribution) Consider any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move contribution game where for some agent i, y i (τ i ), the equilibrium contribution of agent i, is strictly positive τ i -almost surely i.e., Pr{τ i :
i.e., the expected total contribution by all agents generated in this equilibrium does not exceed the expected standalone contribution of agent i. (ii) If, in addition, V i (G) is strictly concave on [0, G], and there exists some agent j = i such that Pr{τ j : y j (τ j ) > 0} > 0, then the inequality in (3) holds strictly i.e., the expected total contribution by all agents generated in this equilibrium is strictly less than the expected standalone contribution of agent i.
Proof Using the first-order condition of the maximization problem (2) faced by agent i of type τ i and the hypothesis that y i (τ i ) > 0 τ i -almost surely, we have:
First, we establish (i). Since (using Assumption 3) V i (.) is concave on [0, G], and from Lemma 1,
almost surely, we have by Jensen's inequality
so that using (Assumption 2) concavity of V i (.) and (2), it follows that
and integrating with respect to the distribution of agent i's type we have:
establishing part (i) of the lemma. Now, consider part (ii) of the lemma. It is easy to check from the first-order conditions of agent j's maximization problem that given y − j (τ − j ), the equilibrium contribution y j (τ j ) of agent j is non-decreasing in the type τ j of agent j. Thus, if τ < τ , τ,τ ∈ A j and y j (τ ) > 0, then y j (τ ) > 0. Further, using (4),
and Jensen's inequality, we have from (4)
so that using strict concavity of V i (.) on [0, G] (Assumption 2) and (1) it follows that
The next result follows immediately from Lemma 3:
Corollary 1 Suppose there is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move contribution game where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, y i (τ i ), the equilibrium contribution of agent i of type τ i , satisfies y i (τ i ) > 0, τ i -almost surely. Then, the expected total contribution in this equilibrium does not exceed min{θ i : i = 1, . . . , N }. If, further, V i (G) is strictly concave on [0, G] for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, then the expected total contribution in this equilibrium is strictly less than min{θ i : i = 1, . . . , N }.
Sequential contribution game
In this section, we analyze the sequential contribution games where agents contribute in an exogenous order of moves with each agent contributing only once.
Let P = {p = ( p 1 , . . . , p N ) : ( p 1 , . . . , p N ) is a permutation of (1, . . . , N )}.
For each p = ( p 1 , . . . , p N ) ∈ P, we can define an N -stage sequential contribution game ( p) where agent p i contributes (only) in the i-th stage after observing contributions made in all previous stages 1, . . . , i − 1. We first specify a lower bound on the total contribution that depends on the last mover's type:
Lemma 4 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of ( p), for each possible realization τ of the type of the last mover p N , the total contribution generated is at least as large as x p N (τ ), her standalone contribution for type τ , and the expected total contribution generated in the game is at least as large as θ p N , the expected standalone contribution of agent p N .
Proof The proof follows from the fact that if z ≥ 0 is the total contribution of agents in the first (N − 1) stages, then in the last stage of the game, the unique optimal action of agent p N of type τ is to contribute max{0, x p N (τ ) − z}.
Next, we argue that as long as the total contribution generated in the first (N − 1) stages is strictly positive with some probability, the expected total contribution generated in the sequential game is strictly higher than the expected standalone contribution of the last mover. The main argument here is that earlier contributors know that even if they contribute zero, the last mover will ensure that the total contribution is at least as large as her standalone contribution (depending on her realized true type). If the total contribution on the equilibrium path in the first (N − 1) stages is below the standalone level for the lowest type of the contributor in stage N , then the last contributor who contributes strictly positive amount (for some realization of her type) among the first (N − 1) movers will always be better off deviating and contributing zero with probability one. Therefore, on an equilibrium path where total contribution in first (N − 1) stages is strictly positive (with strictly positive probability), it must exceed the standalone level of the N -th contributor for the very low realizations of her type.
Lemma 5 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of ( p) where the total contribution generated in the first (N − 1) stages is strictly positive with strictly positive probability, the expected total contribution is strictly higher than θ p N , the expected standalone contribution of agent p N .
Proof In view of Lemma 4, it is sufficient to show that for an event (i.e., a set of type profiles for N agents) of strictly positive probability measure, the generated total contributions must strictly exceed the standalone contributions of agent p N (corresponding to her realized types in those type profiles).
For each realization of types of the first (N −1) contributors ω ∈ N −1 i=1 A i , let z(ω) be the total contribution generated in the first (N − 1) stages. Observe that the unique optimal action of agent p N of type τ in stage N is to contribute max{0, x p N (τ ) − z}, if the total contribution in the first (N − 1) stages is z. We claim that since z(ω) > 0 with strictly positive probability, it must be the case that z(ω) > x p N (τ p N ) with strictly positive probability.
(5)
Suppose, to the contrary, that z(ω) ≤ x p N (τ p N ) almost surely. Then, given the optimal strategy of agent p N , the total contribution generated at the end of the game is exactly identical to that generated if every agent contributes zero with probability one in the first (N − 1) stages. In particular, let k = max{1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1: agent p n makes strictly positive contribution with strictly positive probability}.
By definition, for all n lying strictly between k and N , no contribution occurs (almost surely) on the equilibrium path in stage n. Consider a unilateral deviation where agent p k contributes zero almost surely and independent of history. The distribution of total contribution generated at the end of the game remains unchanged (as the last mover makes up the difference). Therefore, this deviation is strictly beneficial for agent p N −k . This establishes (5). From (5), it follows that there exists > 0 small enough such that
Let τ > τ p N be defined by:
Choose τ ∈ (τ p N , τ ). Since τ p N = min{τ : τ ∈ A p N } and A p N is the support of the probability distribution of τ p N , it follows that F p N ( τ ) > 0. Also note that
as x i (τ i ) is strictly increasing in τ i for all i. Let
Then, using (6),
Let B be the event:
Since Pr(B 1 ) > 0 and F p N ( τ ) > 0, it follows that Pr(B) > 0. Further, using (6) and (7), for realizations of type profiles (of all players) in the set B, the generated total contributions strictly exceed the standalone contributions of agent p N . The proof is complete.
Finally, note that the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the sequential game ( p) is identical to the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes generated when the extensive form is modified so that in stage i, i = 2, . . . , N , agent p i observes perfectly the sum of the actual contributions made by agents p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , but not their individual contributions. Note that the payoff of each agent depends only on the total contribution generated at the end of the game (and not on individual contribution levels) and further, each agent contributes only once so that any information about the private preferences of an agent inferred from her individual contribution level is of no relevance to agents who move later. The strategy sets of players in the modified sequential game is a subset of that in ( p). However, sequential rationality ensures that in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of ( p), at each stage of the game and for each realized history, the strategy of the player of any type who moves at that stage must specify an action that is also optimal if the player observes only the total contribution generated (at the end of the previous stage for that realized history). Therefore, for any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of ( p), working backwards from the last stage and substituting strategies of players that possibly depend on individual past contributions by ones that depend only on the sum of previous contributions, one can construct a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the modified sequential game that is outcome equivalent. Our results in the subsequent sections comparing the expected total contributions generated in the sequential and simultaneous move games are therefore equally valid for versions of the sequential move game where individual contributions are observed imperfectly but the cumulative contribution generated before each stage is observed perfectly.
Comparison of contributions
We now present the paper's main results comparing the expected total contributions generated in the simultaneous and sequential move contribution games.
First, we provide sufficient conditions under which sequential move games that satisfy a certain restriction on the order of moves (specifically, in terms of who moves in the last stage) generate weakly greater expected total contributions compared to the simultaneous move game.
Proposition 1 Consider any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium E of the simultaneous move contribution game where some agent i makes a strictly positive contribution τ i -almost surely. Then, every perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the N -stage sequential move game ( p) where p = ( p 1 , . . . , p N ) and p N = i, generates at least as much expected total contribution as in the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium E of the simultaneous move game.
Proof Follows immediately from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
Next, we state sufficient conditions under which a sequential move game generates strictly higher expected total contributions compared to the simultaneous move game.
Proposition 2 Consider any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium E of the simultaneous move contribution game where some agent i makes a strictly positive contribution τ i -almost surely. Consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium E of the sequential move contribution game ( p) where p = ( p 1 , . . . , p N ) and p N = i. Suppose, further, that at least one of the following hold:
(a) Imperfect Free-Riding: In equilibrium E of the sequential game ( p), ∃ = i (i.e., some agent who moves in one of the first (N − 1) stages) who contributes strictly positive amount with strictly positive probability; (b) V i (G) is strictly concave on [0, G] and there exists some agent j = i such that in the equilibrium E of the simultaneous move contribution game Pr{τ j :
Then, equilibrium E of the sequential move contribution game ( p) generates strictly higher expected total contribution than equilibrium E of the simultaneous move game.
Proof If (a) holds, then the result follows from Lemma 3(i) and Lemma 5. If (b) holds, then the result follows from Lemma 3(ii) and Lemma 4.
The conditions in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are strong sufficient conditions; in particular, the conclusions of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 may hold even if the last mover in the sequential move game is one who contributes zero with positive probability in the simultaneous move game and in fact, even if all players contribute zero with positive probability in the simultaneous move game. We will illustrate these possibilities in examples in Sect. 7.
The next result follows immediately from Proposition 1 and Corollary 1:
Corollary 2 Consider any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium E of the simultaneous move contribution game where every agent makes strictly positive contribution almost surely. Then, for every p ∈ P, every perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the N -stage sequential move game ( p) generates at least as much expected total contribution as in equilibrium E of the simultaneous move game.
Corollary 2 clarifies that if the equilibrium of the simultaneous move game (to which one compares the outcomes of the sequential games) is an "interior equilibrium" where all agents of "almost" all types contribute strictly positive amounts, then there is no need to impose any restriction on the order of moves in the sequential game to ensure that it generates weakly higher expected total contributions. Similarly, using Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, we have immediately:
Corollary 3 Consider any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium E of the simultaneous move contribution game where every agent makes strictly positive contribution almost surely. Suppose, further, that at least one of the following holds:
(a) ∀ p ∈ P, in every perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the N -stage sequential move game ( p), some agent who moves in the first (N −1) stages contributes strictly positive amount with strictly positive probability;
Then, for every p ∈ P, every perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the N -stage sequential move game ( p) generates strictly higher expected total contribution than equilibrium E of the simultaneous move game.
Corollary 3 indicates that if the equilibrium of the simultaneous move game is an "interior equilibrium" then, under certain additional conditions, the sequential move game generates strictly higher expected total contributions independent of the order of moves.
The results outlined in this section indicate that the sequential contribution game generates at least as much expected total contribution as in any equilibrium of the simultaneous contribution game where the agent who moves last in the sequential game contributes a strictly positive amount with probability one. Showing that the sequential game generates strictly higher expected contribution requires that either the marginal utility from the public good is strictly concave or, that the equilibrium of the sequential game is one where the last mover is not the only one that contributes (imperfect free riding).
One implication of this is that we are not able to say anything in general about the comparison of the contributions generated in the sequential game to that in a noninterior equilibrium of the simultaneous move game where, for example, every agent contributes zero for certain realization of types (that occur with strictly positive probability); the technical difficulty here is that the first-order conditions no longer hold with equality for all realizations of types (of a player) and this makes it difficult to obtain a useful bound on the equilibrium expected total contribution. In the next section, we provide explicit verifiable conditions on the payoff function and the distribution of types that ensure that no equilibrium of simultaneous move game is non-interior, and another set of conditions to ensure that in the sequential game, the last mover is not the only one who contributes. Under these conditions, our results on comparison of contributions in this section can be applied independent of which equilibrium we select for each extensive form. Finally, in Sect. 7, we show that for the special case of two agents and two types, the sequential move game may generate strictly higher expected total contribution even if all agents contribute zero with strictly positive probability (equilibrium is non-interior) in the simultaneous move game. Thus, the conditions outlined in this section should be seen as sufficient conditions that are by no means necessary for the superiority of the sequential contribution scheme.
Further conditions
In the previous section, we outlined some conditions under which the expected total voluntary contribution generated in a sequential move game exceeds (weakly or strictly) that generated in a simultaneous move game. One restriction that is required in all of the results outlined in the previous section is that in the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game, a certain agent (in particular, the one who moves last in the sequential game) must contribute strictly positive amount for almost every possible realization of her type. Another condition that ensures that the sequential game generates strictly higher expected total contribution requires that in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the N -stage sequential game, free-riding is imperfect, i.e., some agent moving in the first (N − 1) stages contributes strictly positive amount with strictly positive probability.
In this section, we outline some sufficient and verifiable conditions on the exogenous preferences and distributions of types that ensure that the equilibria of the relevant games satisfy the two properties noted above. It is worth emphasizing that the conditions to be stated are by no means tight. One should view them as merely illustrative of how the antecedents of the main propositions (and corollaries) in the previous section may hold and as indicating that, in particular, the propositions are not vacuous.
While the conditions can be easily written for the general version of the model outlined in Sect. 2, for ease of exposition we will assume that:
Note that Assumption 4 allows for the possibility that agents differ in the distribution of types (i.e., the distribution function F i need not be identical) so that some degree of asymmetry between players is allowed for. However, preferences now only depend on the type of the agent and not on her identity.
First, we provide an easily verifiable condition under which there exists an agent who contributes strictly positive amount with probability one in the simultaneous move game. The condition, however, requires that the distribution of types assigns strictly positive mass to the lowest type of each player.
Pr{τ j = τ j }, and i ∈ argmax k∈{1,...,n} τ k μ −k . 10 Suppose that min j=1,...,N Pr{τ j = τ j } > 0,
Then, in any equilibrium of the simultaneous move game, at least one player contributes strictly positive amount with probability one.
Proof Suppose there is an equilibrium of the simultaneous move game where every player contributes zero with strictly positive probability. Consider player i of type τ i who contributes zero. Then, the total contribution of all other players is zero with probability μ −i and is bounded above by (N − 1)x(τ ) with probability 1 − μ −i , whereτ = max j=1,...,Nτ j . The marginal expected payoff of player i of type τ i (at zero contribution) is
which is implied by (8), then we immediately obtain a contradiction.
It should be clear that condition (8) is significantly more stringent than what is required, and that interior contribution by some player does not really require strictly positive mass point at the lowest type (though an easily verifiable sufficient condition may be more difficult to specify for a continuous distribution function). For specific preferences, one can provide much weaker conditions under which all players make strictly positive contributions with probability one in a simultaneous move game. The following example considers a symmetric two-players game with quadratic utility for the public good.
We do not require any probability mass point at τ . We assume:
Check that x(τ ) = 1 − 1/(2τ ) ∈ (0, 1), τ ∈ [τ , τ ]. It is easy to check that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied. 11 Consider the simultaneous move contribution game. The following is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium: each player of type τ ∈ [τ , τ ] contributes:
Observe that since τ > 2 2+m ,
To see that this is an equilibrium, suppose agent 2 contributes according to strategy y(τ ). Then, consider agent 1's first-order condition for an interior solution to her maximization problem when she is of type τ :
which yields
Thus, both players playing according to the strategy y(τ ) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Next, we outline a condition under which the total contribution generated in the first (N − 1) stages of the sequential move game is strictly positive with strictly positive probability so that the antecedent of Lemma 5 and one of the conditions in Proposition 2(b) and Corollary 3 hold.
To begin, let
Define the function x(τ ) on the entire interval [τ ,τ ] by:
Under Assumption 1,
Note that x(τ ) is the optimal "standalone" contribution of any player of type τ i.e.,
is as defined in Sect. 2. Also, note that x(τ ) is continuous and strictly increasing on [τ ,τ ].
Lemma 7 Consider any sequential contribution game ( p) where p = ( p 1 , . . . , p N ) and p N = i. Let j ∈ {p 1 , . . . , p N −1 } be an agent such that
for some τ ∈ (τ i , τ i ) , then in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of ( p), some agent who moves in the first (N − 1) stages contributes strictly positive amount with strictly positive probability i.e., free-riding is necessarily imperfect.
Proof Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of where the total contribution generated in the first (N − 1) stages is zero almost surely.
It is easy to check that in that case, the contribution generated at the end of the game is exactly the standalone contribution x(τ ) of the last mover i, depending on her realized type τ ∈ A i . Consider agent j (as defined in (10)) who moves in one of the first N − 1 stages. We will show that it is strictly gainful for agent j of type τ j to deviate and contribute a strictly positive amount. The smoothness of the payoff function in τ then implies that there exists > 0 such that deviation is strictly gainful for all types τ j of player j lying in [τ j − , τ j ]. As τ j = sup{τ : τ ∈ A j } where A j is the support of the distribution function F j , it follows that Pr{τ j ∈ [τ j − , τ j ]} > 0 which would be a contradiction.
In the rest of this proof we will show that it is strictly gainful for agent j of type τ j to deviate and contribute an amount equal to x( τ ) > 0 where τ is as defined in the proposition.
Following such a deviation by agent j of type τ j , the total contribution at the end of the game is at least as large as x( τ ) if the last player's (player i's) type τ i ≤ τ , while if τ i > τ then the total contribution is at least as large as x(τ i ). Thus, the expected utility of the deviating agent j of type τ j is:
and so this deviation is gainful as long as:
which is equivalent to:
We want to derive a sufficient condition such that (12) holds for some τ ∈ (τ i , τ i ).
As V is concave,
Therefore, (12) holds as long as
which follows from (11).
Since (11) is likely to be satisfied for some τ ∈ (τ i , τ i ) if τ j is large enough. Further, larger the probability mass of the distribution of types in a neighborhood of τ i , the easier it is for this condition to hold.
The economic intuition is that greater the likelihood that the last mover has very low valuation for the public good, greater the risk faced by an early mover with high valuation for the public good when she tries to fully free ride on the last mover because that may, in certain states of nature, lead to very low provision of the public good. This creates incentive for an early mover with high valuation to make a strictly positive contribution. It is easy to see that (11) is more likely to hold if an early mover has significantly "higher" distribution of valuations (types) than the last mover. Indeed, even under complete information, an early mover may not free ride on the last mover, and may contribute a strictly positive amount if her valuation of the public good is significantly higher than the last mover.
If agents are identical, then under complete information, early movers always free ride fully on the last mover. With incomplete information however, even if all agents have identical distribution of types, early movers may not fully free ride on the last mover-this, in fact, is a crucial difference between the complete and incomplete information sequential games. We illustrate this in the next example where all agents have identical distribution of types and for a specific class of distribution functions, we show that (11) can be satisfied (so that some early mover contributes a strictly positive amount with strictly positive probability).
Example 2 Suppose that F i = F, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, where the support of F is the interval [τ , τ ] and F has the following structure:
Then, (11) reduces to the requirement that:
As
Since H, τ are independent of the distribution function G whose support is [τ , τ ] ,
is independent of H and τ in particular, so (13) holds if τ is large enough.
Finally, we note that condition (13) that ensures strictly positive contribution by some early mover in the sequential game is consistent with the last mover of the sequential game making strictly positive contribution with probability one in the simultaneous move game (as required in some of the results of the previous section). To illustrate this, consider Example 2 above. The sufficient condition (8) in Lemma 6 that ensures that some player contributes strictly positive amount almost surely is satisfied as long as:
and these are perfectly consistent with τ being large enough so that (13) holds.
A special case: two agents, two types
In this section, we discuss a special case of our model with two agents (N = 2) and two potential types. We use this to make two important points.
First, though our general results in Sect. 5 require that at least some agent contributes strictly positive amount with probability one in the simultaneous move game (in order to obtain weakly or strictly higher expected total contribution in the sequential move game), this is by no means necessary. We show that even if all agents contribute zero with strictly positive probability in the simultaneous move game, the sequential move game may still generate strictly higher expected total contribution. Second, our general results in Sect. 5 show that when the last mover is the one who contributes strictly positive amount almost surely in the simultaneous move game, the sequential game generates weakly higher expected total contribution (and under additional conditions, strictly higher contributions). We show that even if the agent who contributes strictly positive amount with probability one in the simultaneous move game moves early in the sequential game and the last mover is an agent who contributes zero with strictly positive probability in the simultaneous move game, the sequential game may still generate strictly higher expected total contribution.
In this section, we assume that Assumptions 1-4 hold so that
and further restrict:
Proposition 1 shows that there is a sequential game that generates weakly higher expected total contribution than the simultaneous move game as long as there is at least one agent who contributes strictly positive amount in the simultaneous move game for (almost) every realization of her type. If, in addition, the requirements of Proposition 2 are satisfied, then the sequential game generates strictly higher expected total contributions. If the simultaneous move game is such that every agent contributes zero with positive probability, then the results outlined in the previous section no longer apply. However, for the special case considered in this section, we can show that under certain conditions, the sequential contribution game generates higher expected total contribution even though the equilibrium in the simultaneous move game is one where both agents contribute zero when their realized type is τ L . Thus, the interiority of equilibrium contributions (for some agent) is not necessary for higher contributions under the sequential form of the contribution game.
Recall that x(τ ) is the "standalone" contribution of type τ as defined earlier.
Proposition 3
Suppose that
where π k = max{π 1 , π 2 }, and i = k.
Then, the expected total contribution generated in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential game ( p), where p = ( p 1 , p 2 ) and p 2 = k, is strictly greater than that generated in any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous contribution game where both agents contribute zero when their realized type is τ L .
The proof appears in the Appendix. For π 1 = π 2 = 1 2 , (14) reduces to the requirement that x(τ H ) < 2x(τ L ), which is quite easily satisfied as long as τ L and τ H are not too far apart.
Next, we point out that even if the sequential move game is such that the agent (or agents) who contribute strictly positive amount for all realization of types in the simultaneous move game move earlier than other agents, the sequential move game may still generate higher expected total contribution than the simultaneous move game. We illustrate this in the example (summarized) below where within the framework of two agents and two types considered in this section, we choose a specific quadratic functional form for the V (.) function.
Example 3 Let
Here, x(τ ) = 1 − 1/(2τ ), τ = τ H , τ L . Note that V (.) is linear (hence, concave) and strictly decreasing (V (.) is strictly concave) on [0, 1]. Here, G = 2 − 1 τ H . Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied as long as τ L > 1 2 , τ H < 1. Suppose π j > π i . Consider the sequential move game ( p) where p = ( j, i) i.e., player j moves first and player i moves next. It can be checked that if
then the first-mover (player j) of τ H -type makes a strictly positive contribution in the (unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the) sequential move game and the expected total contribution generated is:
In the simultaneous move game, it can be shown that there is a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and in this equilibrium, agent j makes a strictly positive contribution for both realization of types, while agent i makes a strictly positive contributionỹ only if it is of τ H -type. The expected total contribution in the simultaneous move game is exactly equal to the expected standalone contribution of agent j i.e.,ỹ = π j x(τ H ) + (1 − π j )x(τ L ). Observe thatz −ỹ =
Thus, even though the agent who has strictly higher probability of being τ H -type and contributes strictly positive amount almost surely in the simultaneous move game moves first in the sequential move game and the agent who does not contribute strictly positive amount almost surely in the simultaneous move game is the last mover in the sequential move game, the sequential game generates (strictly) higher expected total contribution relative to the simultaneous move game if (15) and (16) hold.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let y 1 (τ ), y 2 (τ ), τ = τ H , τ L , denote the equilibrium contributions of the two agents in the simultaneous move game where y 1 (τ L ) = y 2 (τ L ) = 0.
The first-order condition of maximization for agent i of type τ L yields for i, j = 1, 2, j = i,
Using Assumption 2,
which implies that (comparing (17) and (18)) y j (τ H ) > x(τ L ) > 0, j = 1, 2.
From the first-order condition for agent i of type τ H we have for i, j = 1, 2, j = i,
so that τ H V (y i (τ H )) > 1, i = 1, 2 ( 2 0 ) and therefore y i (τ H ) < x(τ H ), i = 1, 2. Thus,
x(τ L ) < y j (τ H ) < x(τ H ), j = 1, 2.
The expected total contribution generated in this game is [π 1 y 1 (τ H ) + π 2 y 2 (τ H )].
Further, from the first-order conditions:
and using the concavity of V (.) on [0, G] and Jensen's inequality we have:
π 1 y 1 (τ H ) + y 2 (τ H ) ≤ x(τ H ) (24) π 2 y 2 (τ H ) + y 1 (τ H ) ≤ x(τ H ).
Also, from (22) and (23), V (y 1 (τ H ) + y 2 (τ H )) < V (x(τ H )) so that
From (21) and (26),
Multiply (24) by π 2 and (25) by π 1 and add to obtain π 1 π 2 y 1 (τ H ) + π 2 y 2 (τ H ) + π 1 π 2 y 2 (τ H ) + π 1 y 1 (τ H ) ≤ (π 1 + π 2 )x(τ H ), implying π 1 y 1 (τ H ) + π 2 y 2 (τ H )
(using (14)) Therefore, the expected total contribution in this equilibrium of the simultaneous move game π 1 y 1 (τ H ) + π 2 y 2 (τ H ) < π k x(τ H ) + (1 − π k )x(τ L ), the expected standalone contribution of agent k. Finally, from Lemma 4, we know that in the sequential move game ( p) where p = ( p 1 , p 2 ), p 2 = k i.e., agent k is the last mover, the expected total contribution generated is at least as large as the expected standalone contribution [π k x(τ H ) + (1 − π k )x(τ L )] of agent k. The proposition follows.
